Kant's response to hume in the second analogy
Başlık çevirisi mevcut değil.
- Tez No: 403455
- Danışmanlar: Dr. DANIEL SUTHERLAND
- Tez Türü: Doktora
- Konular: Felsefe, Philosophy
- Anahtar Kelimeler: Belirtilmemiş.
- Yıl: 2015
- Dil: İngilizce
- Üniversite: Unıversıty Of Illınoıs At Chıcago
- Enstitü: Yurtdışı Enstitü
- Ana Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
- Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
- Sayfa Sayısı: Belirtilmemiş.
Özet
Özet yok.
Özet (Çeviri)
My dissertation aims to solve what I call Kant's“problem of empirical laws,”a problem concerning the coherence of Kant's claims that empirical laws as laws express a kind of necessity, and as empirical they are contingent. In the literature, this issue is usually framed in the context of Kant's relation to Hume and formulated as a question of whether Kant agrees with Hume that empirical laws are mere contingent generalizations. According to those who argue that Kant's main disagreement with Hume concerns the status of the Causal Principle, Kant agrees with Hume that empirical laws are contingent empirical generalizations. The defenders of this view, to which I refer as the“modest reading,”maintain that Kant's argument in the Second Analogy of Experience (henceforth, Second Analogy) aims to respond to Hume's“problem of causation,”a problem that questions the apriority and necessity of the Causal Principle alone. On the modest reading, Kant's Second Analogy argument proves neither the existence nor the necessity of empirical laws. Others who claim that Kant disagrees with Hume on the status of empirical laws, on the other hand, argue that Kant's Second Analogy argument proves not only the necessity of the Causal Principle but also the existence and the necessity of empirical laws. Proponents of this“strong reading”of the Second Analogy argue that by proving that there are necessary empirical laws, Kant aims solve Hume's“problem of induction,”a problem that questions the validity of our belief in the uniformity of nature. After I demonstrate the textual and philosophical problems with both of these readings, I present a novel account of what Kant establishes in the Second Analogy. While the modest and the strong readings agree that in the Second Analogy Kant responds to Hume, they disagree on the nature of the Humean problem Kant wants to solve. In order to understand the nature of these problems and identify the requirements for their solution, I first examine Hume's formulation of the problems of causation and induction. Then, I closely examine Kant's perception of these problems by closely analyzing the texts, where Kant refers to Hume and Hume's problem. Textual evidence reveals that Hume, on Kant's view, focused mainly on the validity of a single metaphysical concept and principle, namely the concept of causation and the Causal Principle. Hence, the Humean problem that Kant aims to solve in the Second Analogy requires a demonstration that the concept of causation and the Causal Principle are justified a priori. Having identified the Humean problem, I focus on Kant's Second Analogy argument where Kant proves the apriority of the Causal Principle. Contra the modest reading, I argue that in the Second Analogy Kant proves the validity of the Causal Principle by proving the existence of law-governed causal relations, which requires the demonstration that all causal relations are subsumed under some necessary empirical law. Thus, even if we cannot have insight into the necessity of individual empirical laws, Kant's Second Analogy argument shows that if empirical laws are true, they are necessarily true. In contrast with the strong reading, however, I argue that the existence of empirical laws does not guarantee the uniformity of nature. Hence, even though Kant's Second Analogy argument lays the ground for a satisfactory solution to Hume's problem of induction, Kant undertakes that task beyond the Second Analogy. In this respect, my dissertation contributes to the literature by (i) demonstrating the false dichotomy between the weak and the strong readings, which respectively assume that in the Second Analogy Kant is either concerned only with the Causal Principle or he is concerned with Hume's problem of induction and (ii) offering a middle ground that fits better in Kant's overall project both textually and philosophically.
Benzer Tezler
- Alopesia areatalı olgularda tedavi öncesi ve tedavi sonrası immünolojik özellikler
Başlık çevirisi yok
AYLA GÜLEKON
