Essays in political economy
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- Tez No: 400333
- Danışmanlar: ANTONIO MERLO
- Tez Türü: Doktora
- Konular: Ekonomi, Economics
- Anahtar Kelimeler: Belirtilmemiş.
- Yıl: 2009
- Dil: İngilizce
- Üniversite: Unıversıty Of Pennsylvanıa
- Enstitü: Yurtdışı Enstitü
- Ana Bilim Dalı: İktisat Ana Bilim Dalı
- Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
- Sayfa Sayısı: Belirtilmemiş.
Özet
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Özet (Çeviri)
Chapter 1: The American presidential nomination process consists of a series of elections(primaries) in which states vote at different times. The problem faced by a political party choosingthe optimal temporal structure for its primaries is studied in an environment in which a sequentialelection may generate voter herding. By choosing the temporal structure, the party can inducevoter herding which is ex ante beneficial in selecting the best candidate. When candidates haveequal loyal support, simultaneous voting is optimal. When one candidate has more loyal support,a sequential election can be optimal since voter herding compensates for the loyal voter imbalance.This novel example of a beneficial information cascade contrasts results from the herding literature.Under sequential voting, states which are smaller, have fewer partisans, have more informed voters,and are more diverse optimally vote first.Chapter 2 (joint with Eleanor L. Harvill): A lack of political knowledge may be why voterspolicy positions often conflict with those of their favored candidate. The National Annenberg ElectionSurvey (NAES) for the 2004 U.S. presidential election solicits citizens opinions and knowledgeof candidates positions regarding specific policies, allowing us to directly estimate and analyze voters?and candidates ideological positions (using Poole and Rosenthal?s (1985, 2000) spatial model),voters knowledge of candidates positions (using item response theory) and voting behavior. Moreknowledgeable individuals are far less likely to vote for the candidate farther from them. Significantlymore vote mistakenly for Bush than for Kerry, so that Bush receives more votes although asignificant majority of voters are ideologically closer to Kerry.Chapter 3: Two heterogeneous buyers must choose to bid on either a high or low value goodwhich are sold in simultaneous first-price auctions. The resulting allocation is efficient only whensellers can commit to reservation prices, as the unique buyer equilibrium with fixed reservationprices exhibits coordination frictions. The high good is sold but the low value good is either notsold or sold at reservation. When sellers commit to reservation prices, a unique market equilibriumwith perfect buyer coordination is achieved. The allocation and payoffs are both equivalent to theprice-posting case.
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