Geri Dön

Essays on dynamic mechanisms

Başlık çevirisi mevcut değil.

  1. Tez No: 400332
  2. Yazar: MURAT YILMAZ
  3. Danışmanlar: PROF. BARTON LIPMAN
  4. Tez Türü: Doktora
  5. Konular: Ekonomi, Economics
  6. Anahtar Kelimeler: Belirtilmemiş.
  7. Yıl: 2011
  8. Dil: İngilizce
  9. Üniversite: Boston Unıversıty
  10. Enstitü: Yurtdışı Enstitü
  11. Ana Bilim Dalı: İktisat Ana Bilim Dalı
  12. Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
  13. Sayfa Sayısı: Belirtilmemiş.

Özet

Özet yok.

Özet (Çeviri)

The .rst chapter considers a natural dynamic auction mechanism in the context ofprivate provision of a discrete public good under incomplete information. There are twobidders with private valuations, and the cost of the public good is common knowledge. Nobidder is willing to provide the good on his own. I show that a natural application of openascending auctions in such environments fails dramatically: The probability of provisionis zero in any equilibrium. I also consider an alternative mechanism in which the rightto contribute .rst is sold in the .rst stage, and in the second stage players are playinga sequential contribution game with the order determined in the .rst stage. I show thatunder some conditions, this mechanism weakly outperforms the sequential contributionmechanism with exogenous order, in terms of the probability of provision.In the second chapter, I consider a repeated principal-agent model with moral hazard,in which the agent has -preferences. I .rst analyze the case where the agent is sophis-ticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting. Facing such anagent, it is optimal for the principal to reward the good performance more and punishthe bad performance more in the early period, relative to the optimal wage scheme for atime-consistent agent. I also consider the case where the agent is naive in the sense thathe is not aware of his time-inconsistency. I show that the principal.s maximum utility isthe same from a sophisticated agent and a naive agent.The third chapter analyzes open innovation projects and their e¤ects on incentivesfor innovation. We model basic features of the General Public License (GPL), one of themost popular open source licenses and study how .rms behave under this license. UnderGPL, a trade-o¤ is present between stimulating innovation and promoting disclosure. Byusing the open source, a .rm can increase its probability of innovation success and itsexpected pro.t in that period. However, any innovation using open source would also beopen source in subsequent periods. This obligation decreases the expected future revenueof the firm

Benzer Tezler

  1. Essays on dynamic macroeconomics

    Başlık çevirisi yok

    CEYHUN ELGİN

    Doktora

    İngilizce

    İngilizce

    2010

    EkonomiUnıversıty Of Mınnesota

    İktisat Ana Bilim Dalı

    VARADARAJAN V. CHARI

    LARRY JONES

  2. Three essays on matching theory and application of school choice problems

    Eşleme teorisi ve okul seçimi uygulamaları ̈uzerine

    DUYGU SİLİ

    Doktora

    İngilizce

    İngilizce

    2022

    EkonomiKoç Üniversitesi

    Ekonomi Bilim Dalı

    DOÇ. DR. ÖZGÜR YILMAZ

  3. Essays on personnel economics

    Başlık çevirisi yok

    EMRE EKİNCİ

    Doktora

    İngilizce

    İngilizce

    2012

    İşletmeCornell Unıversıty

    PROF. MİCHAEL WALDMAN

  4. Essays on integrated macro policy frameworks in small open economies

    Küçük açık ekonomilerde bütünleşik makro politika çerçeveleri üzerine makaleler

    NESLİHAN KAYA EKŞİ

    Doktora

    İngilizce

    İngilizce

    2025

    EkonomiTobb Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi

    Ekonomi Ana Bilim Dalı

    PROF. DR. İSMAİL SAĞLAM

  5. Belirsizlik üzerine makaleler

    Essays on uncertainty

    SEÇİL YILDIRIM KARAMAN

    Doktora

    İngilizce

    İngilizce

    2015

    Ekonomiİhsan Doğramacı Bilkent Üniversitesi

    İktisat Ana Bilim Dalı

    PROF. DR. REFET SOYKAN GÜRKAYNAK